From William White, formerly of the OECD. PDF link here.
A few choice excerpts below, I’ll add more as I finish the paper (it’s slow going for me, I was at best a B+ Econ student in college)
AME = Advanced market economy (eg, the US or Europe or Japan)
Rising inflation along with stagnant demand in AME’s would clearly imply other serious problems for the central banks of AMEs. On the one hand, raising policy rates to confront rising inflation could exacerbate continuing problems of slack demand and financial instability. On the other hand, failing to raise policy rates could cause inflationary expectations to rise. Further, were different central banks to respond differently, as they did in 2008, there might also be unwelcome effects on exchange rates.
One disquieting fact is that these long rates have been trending down, in both nominal and real terms, for almost a decade and there is no agreement as to why this has occurred. Many commentators have thus raised the possibility of a bond market bubble that will inevitably burst.
The famous “Minsky moment” is likely to be shorter, harder to predict, and even more self-fulfilling than Minsky suggested. The failure of Bear Stearns and Lehman provide good examples of these dangers. As well, the shadow banking system has an increasingly international flavor. This not only reduces transparency and the quality of regulatory oversight, but also produces a degree of “balance sheet” exposure that could easily precipitate or aggravate foreign exchange crises.
Third, with central banks so active in so many markets, the danger rises that the prices in those markets will increasingly be determined by the central bank’s actions. While there are both positive and negative implications for the broader economy, as described in earlier sections, there is one clear negative for central banks. The information normally provided to central banks by market movements, information which ought to help in the conduct of monetary policy, will be increasingly absent.
The Japanese crisis of the 1990s began with a very high household saving rate, a very strong home bias for portfolio investment and the world’s largest trade surplus. Contrast this, for example, with the almost opposite position of the US today. A marked shift in market confidence in US Treasury debt would then seem likely to lead to a dollar crisis as well.
Oct 25 addendum: Here’s a September 2022 presentation that he gives on the global economy:
https://williamwhite.ca/2022/09/15/what-next-for-the-global-economy/